# How to audit a folder of signed documents with an AI agent Audit many signed documents in one prompt with an AI agent over MCP: verify each file, collect signer and certificate details, and get one table of what is signed, valid, or missing. Compliance questions are rarely about one file. *"Are all of last quarter's contracts signed?"*, *"whose certificate expired?"*, *"which ones were re-saved after signing?"* — one prompt, a folder, one table. {{< alert style="info" >}} The commands and config snippets on this page are for the **.NET** build of the server — the only platform available today. Installation and client setup: [MCP server for .NET]({{< ref "signature/net/mcp/_index.md" >}}). Other platforms will expose the same tools with their own launch command; everything else on this page applies unchanged. {{< /alert >}} ## Setup Point `GROUPDOCS_MCP_STORAGE_PATH` at the folder ([configuration]({{< ref "signature/net/mcp/configuration.md" >}})). Files are resolved by name, so the agent passes `contract-042.pdf`, not a path from your machine. ## The prompt > For every PDF in my documents folder, check whether it is digitally signed and still valid. Give me a table: file, signer, signed date, status. The agent calls [`search_digital_signatures`]({{< ref "signature/mcp/tools-reference/search-digital-signatures.md" >}}) per file — signer, issuer, signing time, validity period and `isValid` in one call — and assembles the table. A file with no digital signature found is reported as unsigned. ## The three findings that matter * **Unsigned files** — the gap the audit exists to find. * **Invalid signatures** — almost always "something changed after signing": a stamp added later, a re-save, a page appended. Worth knowing which. * **Expired certificates** — the signature was valid when made; whether it still counts is your policy. The validity window is in the data: ask the agent to list every certificate whose validity period ended before today. ## Keep the sweep cheap * Run `search_digital_signatures` on every file and keep its record as the source of truth; [`verify`]({{< ref "signature/mcp/tools-reference/verify.md" >}}) is an optional quick screen, not a substitute. * Skip [`search_image_signatures`]({{< ref "signature/mcp/tools-reference/search-image-signatures.md" >}}) in bulk — it returns base64 images for every hit and inflates the run for nothing. * Leave `returnImage` off on code searches. * Under [metered licensing]({{< ref "signature/mcp/getting-started/licensing.md" >}}#metered-pay-per-use-licensing) each call is billed usage, so a targeted sweep is cheaper as well as faster. ## Two honest limits **The two-page evaluation cap makes bulk audits wrong, not just limited.** A signature on page 4 of an unlicensed run does not appear, so a clean-looking report can be false. Check [`get_license_status`]({{< ref "signature/mcp/tools-reference/get-license-status.md" >}}) first, every time. **This is a report, not an attestation.** The agent summarizes what the engine found; it is not a notary. For formal evidence, keep the per-file certificate details — signer, issuer, serial, timestamp — rather than the agent's prose summary. ## Then act > Sign the three unsigned ones with our standard QR reference and list what you did. Same session, same folder, no uploads — see [Sign documents with AI agents]({{< ref "signature/mcp/use-cases/sign-documents-with-ai-agents.md" >}}). ## Read more * [Enforce Signing Policy with Automated AI Sweeps over MCP](https://blog.groupdocs.com/signature/enforce-signing-policy-automated-audit-mcp/) — the same scenario on the GroupDocs blog, with worked examples and the trade-offs.